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Operators have deployed Multiprotocol Label Switching
(MPLS) in the Internet for over a decade. However, its im-
pact on Internet topology measurements is not well known,
and it is possible for some MPLS configurations to lead to
false router-level links in maps derived from traceroute data.
In this paper, we introduce a measurement-based classifica-
tion of MPLS tunnels, identifying tunnels where IP hops are
revealed but not explicitly tagged as label switching routers,
as well as tunnels that obscure the underlying path. Us-
ing a large-scale dataset we collected, we show that paths
frequently cross MPLS tunnels in today’s Internet: in our
data, at least 30% of the paths we tested traverse an MPLS
tunnel. We also propose and evaluate several methods to
reveal MPLS tunnels that are not explicitly flagged as such:
we discover that their fraction is significant (up to half the
explicit tunnel quantity) but most of them do not obscure
IP-level topology discovery.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) [1] was designed to
reduce the time required to make forwarding decisions. It is
now deployed to provide additional virtual private network
(VPN) services [2] and traffic engineering capability [3, 4].
To accomplish this, an IP router inserts one or more 32-bit
label stack entries (LSE) into a packet, before the IP header,
that determines the forwarding actions made by subsequent
MPLS Label Switching Routers (LSRs) in the network. A se-
ries of LSRs connected together form a Label Switched Path
(LSP). MPLS networks are deployed on IP routers that use
a label distribution protocol [5, 6].
In an MPLS network, packets are forwarded using an ex-
act match lookup of a 20-bit label found in the LSE. An
MPLS LSE also has a time-to-live (LSE-TTL) field and a
type-of-service field. At each MPLS hop, the label of the in-
coming packet is replaced by a corresponding outgoing label
found in an MPLS switching table. The MPLS forwarding
engine is lighter than the IP forwarding engine because find-
ing an exact match for a label is simpler than finding the
longest matching prefix for an IP address.
MPLS routers may send ICMP time-exceeded messages
when the LSE-TTL expires. In order to debug networks
where MPLS is deployed, routers may also implement RFC
4950 [7], an extension to ICMP that allows a router to em-
bed an MPLS label stack in an ICMP time-exceeded mes-
sage. The router simply quotes the MPLS label stack of the
probe in the ICMP time-exceeded message. RFC4950 is
particularly useful to operators as it allows them to verify
the correctness of their MPLS tunnels and traffic engineer-
ing policy. This extension mechanism has been implemented
by router manufacturers since 1999 [8], and is displayed by
modified versions of traceroute [9] that report the label stack
returned by each hop in addition to RTT values currently
displayed. If the first MPLS router of an LSP (the Ingress
Label Edge Router - LER) copies the IP-TTL value to the
LSE-TTL field rather than setting the LSE-TTL to an ar-
bitrary value such as 255, LSRs along the LSP will reveal
themselves via ICMP messages even if they do not imple-
ment RFC4950. Operators configure this action using the
ttl-propagate option provided by the router manufacturer.
These two “MPLS transparency” features – RFC 4950
functionality and the ttl-propagate option – increase the
observability of otherwise opaque MPLS tunnels during IP-
level topology discovery based on traceroute. Unfortunately,
lack of universal deployment of these two features (ingress
LERs that do not enable the ttl-propagate option, and
LSRs that do not support the RFC4950 ICMP extensions)
means that current traceroute-based inference methods can
cause false router-level links to be inferred and underesti-
mates MPLS deployment in the Internet.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate new inference meth-
ods to reduce the errors induced by MPLS tunnels on IP-
level topology discovery, by identifying their presence in the
forwarding path even in the face of incomplete deployment of
these two features. Section 2 presents a taxonomy of MPLS
tunnel configurations and how they appear in traceroute
output. Our taxonomy is conceptually a 2x2 matrix of the
two MPLS transparency features. Section 3 positions our
work amongst the current state of the art. In section 4 we
describe our measurement experiment designed to quantify
the extent of MPLS tunnels obscured from traceroute. Our
experimental results in section 5 indicate that MPLS tun-
nels are common in today’s Internet; from 75 vantage points
to every routed BGP prefix at least 30% of traceroutes tra-
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of MPLS tunnel configurations and corresponding traceroute behaviours. LSRs in
implicit tunnels do not explicitly reveal the use of MPLS. Opaque and invisible tunnels hide LSRs and
contribute to false router-level links.
versed at least one explicit MPLS tunnel. Section 6 evalu-
ates two complementary tunnel fingerprinting methods: one
based on the quoted IP TTL in ICMP time-exceeded mes-
sages, and the other on the IP TTL returned by suspected
LSRs in ICMP echo reply messages. Section 7 estimates the
number of IP links missed and misinterpreted due to MPLS
tunnels that do not activate the ttl-propagate option. Fi-
nally, section 8 concludes the paper by summarising its main
achievements and discusses directions for future work.
2. MPLS TUNNEL TAXONOMY
The absence or presence of the two MPLS transparency
features frame our taxonomy of four classes of MPLS tun-
nels. Figure 1 illustrates the four classes. In all cases, router
R1 is the entry of the MPLS tunnel and is the first router
to push an MPLS label; we call this router the ingress LER.
Router R2 is the first LSR where the incoming packet in-
cludes a LSE; we call this router the ingress hop (IH). The
IH is the first LSR where RFC4950 applies and the first ex-
plicitly labeled hop. In figure 1 router R4 is the last router
that pops the MPLS label; we call this router the last hop
(LH). At least for Cisco routers, the LH router is located
one hop before the egress LER due to the use of penultimate
hop popping (PHP) [1, 10]. In this case, the last MPLS hop
is implicit because the packet does not need to carry any
LSE. Therefore, our four tunnel categories are:
• explicit tunnels: both ttl-propagate and RFC4950
are enabled. The tunnel and its internal structure are
visible. Each hop within the LSP is flagged as such (as
illustrated with “MPLS” in figure 1).
• implicit tunnels: the ingress LER enables the ttl-propagate
option but LSRs do not implement RFC4950. In this
case, while the internal IP structure of the tunnel is vis-
ible, its existence as an MPLS tunnel is not revealed.
As illustrated in figure 1, the traceroute output of a
path containing an implicit tunnel is equivalent to a
trace without any MPLS indication.
• opaque tunnels: LSRs implement RFC4950 but the
ingress LER does not enable the ttl-propagate op-
tion. Only the LH of the LSP reveals a LSE and the
internal structure of the LSP is hidden. In figure 1, the
opaque tunnel hides two LSRs (R2 and R3), allowing
an erroneous link to be inferred between R1 and R4.
• invisible tunnels: the ingress LER does not enable
the ttl-propagate option and RFC4950 is not im-
plemented by the LH router. In figure 1, two IP hops
are hidden and the LH router does not flag itself as
part of an LSP. Again, a link between R1 and R4 is
erroneously inferred.
Only explicit tunnels are directly interpretable from trace-
route output. The other categories require additional pro-
cessing and/or active probing to interpret. In this paper, we
propose methods to identify implicit and opaque tunnels.
3. RELATED WORK
Sommers et al. recently examined the characteristics of
MPLS deployments that are explicitly identified using RFC-
4950 extensions, as observed in CAIDA’s topology data [11].
In this data, they found explicit tunnels in 7% of ASes, and
the fraction was constant over three years of data; how-
ever, the total number of explicit MPLS tunnels varied over
time. They also developed a methodology to infer MPLS
tunnels in archived data where ICMP extensions are not
recorded. CAIDA’s topology data began recording ICMP
extensions in May 2008; to enable MPLS deployment trends
to be analysed prior to this, they implemented a passive
Bayesian inference method. Their key observations are (1)
interfaces in LSPs are likely to be numbered using IP ad-
dresses that are close in terms of prefix length, and (2) RTTs
of time-exceeded messages from all LSRs in an LSP are
likely to be similar because a common MPLS configuration
is for all LSRs to forward these messages to the end of the
LSP for the egress router to return1. Our studies are com-
plementary; we examine the deployment of explicit tunnels,
but we also develop methods to infer other configurations
that cause the LSP to be obscured from traceroute. In ad-
dition, because our studies are complementary our methods
can be used conjointly to cross-validate each other.
Sherwood et al. investigated the presence of anonymous
and hidden routers as part of DisCarte [12]. They found that
0.3% of routers in their dataset were hidden from traceroute
because they did not decrement the TTL. They identified
anonymous and hidden routers using the IP Record Route
option; however, they note that routers involved in an MPLS
LSP do not record an IP address in the IP option space
provided, so the record route option is not able to identify
hidden routers in opaque or invisible configurations.
1That is, all traceroute probes through an LSP make the
same round trip. However, pure IP routers may be inferred
to be part of an LSP if (for example) an ASes preferred
route to the source of the traceroute probes is also through
the same egress point towards the destination.
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Figure 2: Characteristics of explicit tunnels. Half of the monitors in our study observe an explicit tunnel in
at least 40% of paths. In our data, 95% of unique tunnels begin at least 5 IP hops away from the monitor,
and 90% of tunnels are less than five hops in length.
4. DATASET
Because only explicit tunnels are directly retrievable from
traceroute output, we designed our own measurement ex-
periment to study implicit and opaque tunnels. We used
Paris traceroute with ICMP-echo packets [13] to collect the
forward IP path, and for each interface discovered we sent
ICMP-echo probes in order to infer implicit tunnels (see
section 6.1). We generated target IP address lists based on
prefixes found in a Route Views [14] BGP table from Au-
gust 2011, probing a random address in each /16 for prefixes
not enclosed in any other prefix of length 16 or shorter, and
probing a random address in each other prefix of length 24 or
shorter, but only one destination in any /24. We evenly di-
vided each target list among a team of 25 PlanetLab vantage
points (VPs). In total we used three teams (75 PlanetLab
VPs) with three different target lists. Of the 75 VPs, 45
were located within the US; the other 30 VPs were located
in 18 different countries. Data was collected on August 24th,
2011 using scamper [15].
5. EXPLICIT TUNNELS
In this section, we focus on explicit tunnels, i.e., LSPs
where the ttl-propagate option is enabled at the ingress
LER and whose LSRs implement RFC4950. Our goal is not
to show AS-level graph statistics or other statistics provided
in [11] but rather to use explicit tunnels as a basis to esti-
mate MPLS tunnels obscured from traceroute.
Figure 2(a) provides, for each monitor, the fraction of
traceroutes encountering at least one explicit MPLS tunnel;
monitors are sorted according to their proportion of trace-
routes including explicit tunnels. For seven monitors (one
in France, the others in North and South America), every
traceroute path traversed an MPLS tunnel since the hosting
ISP used MPLS. Apart from these extreme cases, MPLS is
quite prevalent in our observations. Typically, more than
30% of the paths we infer from each monitor exhibit at least
one explicit MPLS tunnel. This corroborates Sommers et
al. recent results [11], where they observed an MPLS tunnel
in 25% of their studied paths.
Figures 2(b) and 2(c) plot characteristics of uniquely ob-
served tunnels. We uniquely identify an MPLS tunnel as
a list of labelled IP addresses < h0, h1, h2, . . . , hn−1, hn >,
where h0 is the IH router, hn the LH router, and hi’s are
LSRs within the LSP; we do not consider the MPLS label
for identifying tunnels as there may be a different label for
each routed prefix. Counting MPLS tunnels this way yields
an average of 1,200 explicit tunnels per vantage point, and a
global total (i.e., the inter-monitor union of explicit tunnels)
of 51,881 distinct explicit tunnels.
We also quantified MPLS deployment at an IP interface
granularity by counting the number of interfaces that return
an ICMP response with an RFC4950 MPLS extension, and
dividing by the total number of interfaces observed. Our
experiment resulted in a ratio of 21,921
385,129
≈ 5.6% highlighting
that MPLS is well deployed in today’s Internet.
Our results also indicate that MPLS is more prevalent in
the core of the Internet (i.e., in Tier-1 ASes) than in leaf net-
works (i.e., Stub ASes). Figure 2(b) plots the distribution
of IP hop distance between the PlanetLab monitors and the
IH router of an explicit LSP. In more than 95% of the cases,
an MPLS tunnel starts at least five IP hops from the mon-
itor location. Apart from extreme cases such as the seven
monitors with MPLS support within the monitor’s hosting
ISP, the first tunnel is not located within the monitor’s ISP
but at least one AS further in the AS topology. Our di-
versity of probed destinations offers a comprehensive set of
independent traces to study MPLS deployment.
Finally, figure 2(c) plots the distribution of explicit tunnel
length, i.e. the number of subsequent explicitly labelled IP
addresses2. 90% tunnels are relatively short with no more
than five hops. However, we encounter a 23-router tunnel
in the NTELOS network. It may be an anomaly, or it may
be a management LSP that purposefully crosses many nodes
and links, allowing the member routers to be monitored with
ping, as a single probe will cross them all.
6. IMPLICIT TUNNELS
Implicit tunnels are those that enable the ttl-propagate
option but do not enable RFC4950. They provide a classic
behavior when tracerouting through them; we do not miss
any information at the IP level and do not derive false links
because of their presence. However, LSRs within an implicit
tunnel are not flagged as such and require additional probing
to reveal their existence and estimate MPLS deployment.
2Note that the RFC4950 implementation is on a per router
basis, therefore an explicit tunnel may be only a subset of
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Figure 3: Detection of implicit MPLS tunnels using TTL signatures. It is the LSE-TTL that is decremented
until expiry, so the quoted IP-TTL in ICMP time-exceeded messages will be > 1; we infer an implicit tunnel
using signatures of increasing quoted IP-TTL values. Some LSRs send ICMP error messages via a nominated
router but send ICMP echo replies directly, so the IP-TTL of these packets will be different for the same
router; we infer an implicit tunnel using signatures of decreasing difference in received IP-TTLs.













explicit signature coverage implicit
Figure 4: The fraction of explicit and implicit tun-
nels as viewed by each monitor. Some monitors in-
fer many more implicit tunnels, suggesting the lo-
cation of each monitor can introduce measurement
error. We deduce implicit tunnels are three times
less prevalent than explicit tunnels.
6.1 Inference Methodology
It is possible to detect some implicit tunnels by examining
the IP packet quoted in an ICMP time-exceeded reply, in
particular the TTL of the probe quoted when the reply was
generated. This specific TTL is called the quoted TTL. A
quoted TTL > 1 is likely due to use of the ttl-propagate
option at the ingress LER of an LSP. For each traceroute
probe that visits a subsequent LSR within an LSP, the quoted
TTL will be one greater, and we will observe an increasing
sequence of quoted TTL values in traceroute. We call this
fingerprint technique the q-ttl signature, and it is illustrated
in figure 3. We are not able to exploit the q-ttl signature
if a LSR sets the IP-TTL to the LSE-TTL (1) when the
LSE-TTL expires.
However, additional ping probing can reveal what we call
the MPLS u-turn tunnel signature. It relies on the fact that
most LSRs in an LSP present a common behavior: when the
LSE-TTL expires, the LSR first sends the time-exceeded
reply to the LH router which then forwards the reply to the
probing source, but the LSR sends other packets using an
IP route if available. Operators can configure this behaviour
using the mpls ip ttl-expiration pop command on Cisco
routers. If the command is used, the IP-TTL received at
each monitor from packets sent by the same router will be
different for time-exceeded replies than for other packets,
and for each LSR in an LSP we will observe a signature
of decreasing difference in IP-TTL values. In figure 3, the
u-turn tunnel signature corresponds to the dotted lines.
We use the ping measurements in our dataset to detect
u-turn signatures. As we observed each unique IP address,
we sent it six ICMP-echo packets from the same monitor.
Six ICMP-echo responses allows us to infer with 95% confi-
dence [16] if there is a single return path length and therefore
reduce measurement error caused by a reverse path contain-
ing load-balanced segments of different lengths. For more
than 99% of the interfaces tested, the reply TTL was the
same for all six responses. The u-turn signatures we search
for are in the form of X, X − 2, X − 4, X − 6, ..., 2, 0
where X corresponds to two times the tunnel length; X is
two times the tunnel length because in the ideal case the
path from the egress LER towards the monitor is via the
ingress LER, so each link in the LSP is crossed twice.
Other behaviors occur and can also defeat the u-turn sig-
nature. For example, an LSR may be able to send the
time-exceeded reply by its own if it has an IP route to
the source. Similarly, if each LSR forwards the ping replies
through the egress LER there is no visible u-turn signature
because the return paths for time-exceeded and echo replies
are the same. In a more general case, each LSR may forward
echo replies through different exit routers back to the mon-
itor, and the u-turn signature becomes more or less visible
according to the length of the LSP. Finally, operators can
prevent our echo requests from reaching their router inter-
faces, and some LSRs may not be able to send echo replies
if they do not have a route towards our monitor, such as if
they are not involved in the global IP routing plan (BGP).
6.2 Evaluation
Next we evaluate our two fingerprint mechanisms by ana-
lyzing their presence in explicit tunnels. We expect a large
fraction of explicit tunnels to cross-validate at least one of
our two tunnel signatures because the difference between ex-
plicit and implicit tunnels is implicit tunnels do not return
time-exceeded replies with RFC4950 extensions. If a large
fraction of explicit tunnels also display q-ttl and u-turn sig-
natures and these signatures are not more frequent in the
global dataset, we deduce that our mechanisms are able to
discover most implicit tunnels.
We first consider the echo-reply TTL minimizing the u-
turn value computed at each hop. If we consider the number
of IP addresses that are identified as LSRs either explicitly
using RFC4950 extensions, or inferred using q-ttl and u-turn













Figure 5: Distribution of LSP length by tunnel type.
We find that the distribution of tunnel lengths is
similar for explicit and opaque tunnels. There is a
higher fraction of short implicit tunnels, which we
believe is caused by limitations in our methodology.
signatures, then we infer that more than 11% of IP addresses
belong to LSRs, and half of these are identified only through
signatures. More than half of explicitly labelled IP addresses
(≈ 66%) also exhibit either q-ttl (48%) or u-turn (41%)
signatures. The fraction of explicitly labelled IP addresses
covered by u-turn signatures is lower because 30% of IP
addresses probed did not respond to ping. However, more
IP addresses with u-turn signatures did not intersect with
explicitly identified LSRs than did IP addresses with q-ttl
signatures.
These results can be explained as follows: (1) the IP level
view is biased due to false signatures derived from small
isolated u-turn delta ∈ [2, 3], and (2) there exists some de-
pendence between LSRs that include ICMP extensions and
exhibit the q-ttl signature. To overcome the first limitation
and accurately quantify the fraction of tunnels that are im-
plicit, we decide to focus on tunnels whose lengths are at
least 3. For explicit tunnels that are longer than 3 hops,
u-turn and q-ttl signatures are found in more than 75% of
explicit tunnels; this value is almost constant for all tun-
nels between 3 and 10 hops in length. We therefore infer
that short u-turn signatures induce an overestimation of the
fraction of MPLS tunnels that are implicit. Finally, we find
that 36% of tunnels at least three hops in length that were
inferred with q-ttl and u-turn signatures (implicit tunnels)
do not intersect with explicit tunnels.
6.3 Quantification
Assuming our signatures are able to cover the same frac-
tion of implicit tunnels as explicit tunnels, we deduce there
are approximatively half as many implicit tunnels as there
are explicit tunnels (0.36 × 4
3
≈ 0.5). This evaluation may
overestimate the fraction of tunnels that are implicit: if a
single hop does not exhibit a signature then we may infer a
sequence of short implicit tunnels rather than a single longer
implicit tunnel. Therefore, our estimation of the fraction
of MPLS tunnels that are implicit is likely to be an upper
bound.
Figure 4 plots the relative fractions of unique explicit and
implicit tunnels inferred in paths traced by each monitor.
We split explicit tunnels into two parts; tunnels where there
was q-ttl or u-turn signature overlap, and tunnels where
there was none. For most monitors, roughly 60% of explicit
signatures are covered by our signatures. However, the num-
ber of tunnels inferred as implicit is much more variable,
and we do not believe the fraction of implicit MPLS tunnels
compared to explicit MPLS tunnels depends this much on
monitor location. We believe routing policies towards our
monitors can lead to an overestimation of the number of im-
plicit tunnels. Excluding the monitors where a large fraction
of tunnels inferred are implicit, which we argue are outliers
caused by measurement error, suggests implicit tunnels are
three times less prevalent than explicit tunnels.
Figure 5 plots the length of each type of MPLS tunnel
inferred. In our data, implicit tunnels are shorter than ex-
plicit tunnels, mostly between two and three hops, as shown
in figure 5. As MPLS forwarding policies may differ accord-
ing to each monitor, using additional monitors allows us to
reveal more u-turn signatures. However, it also can produce
false distinct implicit tunnels.
Performing the same analysis considering the echo-reply
TTL maximizing each u-turn delta, we notice that our sig-
natures cover about 80% of explicit tunnels while 41% of
them do not intersect any explicit tunnels (reported to their
quantity for tunnels longer than two hops). Maximizing u-
turn delta, we obtain a similar result ( 1
0.8
× 0.41 ≈ 0.5).
Implicit tunnels seems to be between two and three times
less numerous than explicit ones.
7. OPAQUE TUNNELS
Opaque tunnels refer to tunnels whose Ingress LER does
not enable the ttl-propagate option but where the LH en-
ables RFC4950. Only the LH is visible and the opaque tun-
nel appears as a single-hop LSP, the remainder of the tunnel
being hidden from traceroute (see figure 1). We declare each
(Ingress-LER, LH) pair to be a unique opaque tunnel.
7.1 Inference Methodology
The LSE-TTL returned by the LH in the time-exceeded
reply indicates the presence of an opaque tunnel and its
length, i.e., the number of hidden LSRs. When the ttl-pro-
pagate option is not activated, the ingress LER initialises
the LSE-TTL to 255 so that the packet is unlikely to expire
in the tunnel. Each LSR decrements the TTL, so when the
LH router receives the packet the LSE-TTL will be 255 −
(n+ 1) for a tunnel of n hops. Note that an opaque tunnel
of one hop is equivalent to an explicit tunnel of one hop and
we cannot distinguish them.
In figure 1 the Ingress LER R1 sets the MPLS TTL to
255, rendering the tunnel opaque; at the LH (router R4) the
LSE-TTL will be 253, indicating that the tunnel obscures
two LSRs. Based on this basic computation, we can estimate
the length of an opaque tunnel even if we are not able to
reveal its internal LSRs.
It is possible that the LH LSR may not include RFC4950
extensions if it first pops the last MPLS label from the
packet before it constructs the ICMP time-exceeded re-
ply. If this happens, the LSP falls into the invisible cate-
gory. Using our own MPLS testbed, we notice that Cisco LH
LSRs return an MPLS header in their ICMP time-exceeded
replies when the ttl-propagate option is disabled at the
Ingress LER. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that in most
cases, the LH routers of opaque tunnels are visible.
7.2 Quantification
In our measurement experiment, opaque tunnels were not
prevalent. We find that opaque tunnels are approximately
twenty times less prevalent than explicit tunnels. This is
likely to be a lower bound since we only count the LH of
opaque tunnels; unique paths between the ingress LER and
the LH are hidden. Regardless, the most significant con-
tribution is the methodology to detect opaque tunnels and
avoid the inference of false router-level links.
Half of the opaque tunnels that we observed in our data
are short, between two and three routers, as shown in fig-
ure 5. We encountered two opaque tunnels made of 20 LSRs.
It is possible to estimate the number of hidden and false
links inferred when using traceroute to discover the IP-level
Internet topology. Figure 1 shows how missing two routers
can lead to a false inference of a link between R1 and R4.
The distribution of opaque tunnel length gives a hint of the
router-level links missed due to opaque tunnels.
It is sometimes possible to infer the LSRs inside an opaque
tunnel using additional traceroute measurements. The pro-
cess to do so is iterative; it begins with a traceroute towards
the LH router. Assuming the use of PHP, a new LH LSR
may reveal itself with a time-exceeded message one hop be-
fore the LH router we tracerouted. The process continues
until the ingress LER is reached. Unfortunately, in practice,
most internal hops do not respond to traceroute and cannot
be determined.
8. CONCLUSION
MPLS is commonly deployed in today’s Internet; in our
data, at least 30% of traceroutes from most vantage points
reveal explicit MPLS tunnels and more than 5% of collected
IP interfaces explicitly exhibit MPLS capability. However,
explicit tunnels are only one type of MPLS tunnel. In this
paper, we developed fingerprinting mechanisms to (1) infer
implicit tunnels which hide the use of MPLS but do not
obscure the underlying links, and (2) infer opaque tunnels
which obscure the underlying links but do not hide the use
of MPLS to do so. We estimate that, in addition to the
substantial deployment of explicit tunnels, there are half as
many of implicit tunnels deployed (upper bound) and twenty
times fewer opaque tunnels deployed (lower bound).
In this paper, we did not investigate invisible tunnels.
Given the tendencies observed in this paper (i.e., implicit
tunnels are less prevalent than explicit tunnels and opaque
tunnels are less numerous than implicit tunnels), we be-
lieve that invisible tunnels are very infrequent. Assuming
the independence of the two MPLS features (RFC4950 and
ttl-propagate), we estimate that invisible tunnels are 40 to
50 times less numerous than explicit tunnels. Future work
should help us to refine this analysis.
The state of the art in Internet topology measurement is
essentially and necessarily a set of hacks, which introduce
many sources of possible errors. Opaque and invisible tun-
nels can introduce false IP-level links into maps derived from
traceroute data and can affect graph characteristics such as
router degree. Our methodology to infer opaque tunnels al-
lows high-degree nodes caused by these tunnels to be iden-
tified and their impact on graph properties to be analysed.
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